Taxes and stock return seasonality: evidence from the London Stock Exchange
Article Abstract:
Research indicates that the introduction of capital gains taxes in Great Britain in Apr 1965 also introduced stock market and stock return seasonality on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The LSE had not evidenced seasonality effects prior to the establishment of capital gains taxes. The seasonality effects are most noticeable in Jan and Apr. The Apr-occurring seasonal effects are consistent with tax-loss-selling hypotheses, making the seasonality attributable to the introduction of a capital gains tax. Paradoxically, the Jan-occurring seasonal effects are not explainable in this way. The research also indicates that hypotheses related to stock market behaviors occurring outside the US cannot be used to explain US stock market phenomena, and vice versa.
Publication Name: The Journal of Business
Subject: Business, general
ISSN: 0021-9398
Year: 1987
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Proprietary and nonproprietary disclosures
Article Abstract:
Disclosure policies that arise from tension between the management objectives of protecting proprietary information and making value-increasing disclosures are examined. Disclosure policies are characterized, conditions under which less-than-complete disclosure occurs are identified, and how changes in mandatory reporting requirements affect voluntary disclosure policies is considered. When managers are endowed with both proprietary and nonproprietary information, nondisclosure or partial disclosure may be optimal even if verifiable announcements of all information may occur. Contrary to the usual conjecture, the incentives for voluntary disclosure are increased by increasing mandatory reporting requirements.
Publication Name: The Journal of Business
Subject: Business, general
ISSN: 0021-9398
Year: 1986
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Inside training and incentives
Article Abstract:
When executives within a firm are paid based upon the earnings of the firm, the management team and the corporation itself would benefit from allowing the executives to trade in the company's stock, based upon insider information. This theory is substantiated with a multiple shareholder - single agent model.
Publication Name: The Journal of Business
Subject: Business, general
ISSN: 0021-9398
Year: 1984
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