The dynamic interplay between employees' feedback-seeking strategies and supervisors' delivery of performance feedback

Article Abstract:

This article examines the relationship between employees' feedback-seeking behavior and the informal performance feedback they receive from their supervisors. The focus is on those situations in which the employee is performing poorly. The central thesis is that when employees suspect that they are performing poorly, they often use feedback-seeking strategies that tend to minimize the amount of negative performance feedback they receive. Processes operating on both sides of the supervisor-employee interaction are identified as likely contributors to this effect. For the employee, these processes are rooted in a deep-seated motivation to maintain a positive self-esteem, and for the supervisor, they are rooted in an underlying reluctance about giving negative performance feedback. (Reprinted by permission of the employee.)

Performance standards, Job performance standards

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Relative performance information: the effects of common uncertainty and contract type on agent effort

Article Abstract:

Relative performance evaluation (RPE) is the method of assessing the performance of a worker in relation to that of other workers. Research was conducted to examine the direct effects of behavioral and economic factors on the perfomance of workers who know that they and their supervisors will receive information from the RPE. Specifically, the study investigated the effects of the degree of environmental uncertainty among workers and the type of these workers' employment contract on work performance. Results showed that workers with under the RPE contract exerted more effort than those under non-RPE contract.

Labor contracts, Agency theory

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The controllability principle in responsibility accounting

Article Abstract:

The concept of controllability, or the notion that managers should be evaluated on what they control, is examined. Researchers working on the managerial evaluation problem found that the optimal agency solution does not bear any logical relation to a causal definition of controllability in a principal-agent setting. The information content perspective was found to supply a precise definition of controllability.

Analysis, Human resource management

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