Learning, reputation and entry deterrence: a chain-store game with correlated entrants

Article Abstract:

Uninformed participants in a variation of Selten's chain-store game that correlated entrant's types tended to conduct experiments in the initial market. This action led to learning about entrant types and plans to curb future entry. Introducing correlation lessens an incumbent's aggressive manner.

Social aspects, Industrial organization, Aggressiveness (Psychology)

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Mixed-strategy equilibria in a quality differentiation model

Article Abstract:

Research is presented concerning the mixed-strategy equilibrium which results from business enterprises choosing differing strategies in the first-stage quality game. The effect on industry profits is discussed.

Management, Profit, Profits, Quality control, Business enterprises

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Non-Nash equilibria of Darwinian dynamics with applications to duopoly

Article Abstract:

Non-Nash equilibria of Darwinian dynamics with duopoly applications is considered.

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