Limit pricing when incumbents have conflicting interests
Article Abstract:
A case wherein two incumbents disagree about the desirability of entry is investigated. Analysis shows that the separating equilibrium is non-distortionary since it requires prices to remain the same as if there was no potential entry. Moreover, it is shown that the separating equilibria will exist only if the gain from deterring or provoking entry is not too large for at least one of the firms, relative to the cost of deviating to the Nash-equilibrium price of the other state.
Publication Name: International Journal of Industrial Organization
Subject: Business, international
ISSN: 0167-7187
Year: 1999
User Contributions:
Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:
Fashion and sales
Article Abstract:
Research is presented concerning the predictable clearance sales techniques of shopkeepers. The mechanism used by monopolists to discriminate by price on an inter-temporal basis even when consumer behavior is predictable is discussed.
Publication Name: International Journal of Industrial Organization
Subject: Business, international
ISSN: 0167-7187
Year: 2001
User Contributions:
Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:
- Abstracts: The optimal life of a patent when the timing of innovation is stochastic. Second-mover advantages in the strategic adoption of new technology under uncertainty
- Abstracts: Simmering dispute over antitrust. Reviving German capitalism
- Abstracts: Studying consideration in the consumer decision process: progress and challenges. Category structure, brand recall, and choice
- Abstracts: Sticky prices in a dynamic oligopoly: an investigation of (s,S) thresholds. Strategic pricing, signalling, and costly information acquisition