The limits of arbitrage
Article Abstract:
Textbook arbitrage in financial markets requires no capital and entails no risk. In reality, almost all arbitrage requires capital, and is typically risky. Moreover, professional arbitrage is conducted by a relatively small number of highly specialized investors using other people's capital. Such professional arbitrage has a number of interesting implications for security pricing, including the possibility that arbitrage becomes ineffective in extreme circumstances, when prices diverge far from fundamental values. The model also suggests where anomalies in financial markets are likely to appear, and why arbitrage fails to eliminate them. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)
Publication Name: Journal of Finance
Subject: Business
ISSN: 0022-1082
Year: 1997
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Liquidation values and debt capacity: a market equilibrium approach
Article Abstract:
We explore the determinants of liquidation values of assets, particularly focusing on the potential buyers of assets. When a firm in financial distress needs to sell assets, its industry peers are likely to be experiencing problems themselves, leading to asset sales at prices below value in best use. Such illiquidity makes assets cheap in bad times, and so ex ante is a significant private cost of leverage. We use this focus on asset buyers to explain variation in debt capacity across industries and over the business cycle, as well as the rise in U.S. corporate leverage in the 1990s. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)
Publication Name: Journal of Finance
Subject: Business
ISSN: 0022-1082
Year: 1992
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Do managerial objectives drive bad acquisitions?
Article Abstract:
In a sample of 326 US acquisitions between 1975 and 1987, three types of acquisitions have systematically lower and predominantly negative announcement period returns to bidding firms. The returns to bidding shareholders are lower when their firm diversifies, when it buys a rapidly growing target, and when its managers performed poorly before the acquisition. These results suggest that managerial objectives may drive acquisitions that reduce bidding firms' values. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)
Publication Name: Journal of Finance
Subject: Business
ISSN: 0022-1082
Year: 1990
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