A model of management teams
Article Abstract:
The dynamics of management teams was analyzed using a simple model in which the time it takes to make decisions is linked to the size of the committee. The model takes into consideration the different aspects of the covariance matrix of the observational errors received by committee members which are relevant to the optimal size of the team. Empirical results showed that the optimal size of the management team decreases as the positive correlation between the managers' signals increases. On the other hand, a small negative correlation might result in the existence of large management teams due to complementarity.
Publication Name: Managerial & Decision Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0143-6570
Year: 1998
User Contributions:
Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:
Postmerger performance, managerial superiority and the market for corporate control
Article Abstract:
The difference between the market and book value, or excess value, of both the acquiring and acquired firm is used to determine their postmerger performance. An empirical study shows that postmerger performance is inversely related to the acquiring firm's premerger performance while it is not correlated with the acquired firm's performance before the merger. Performance after merger is also found to have direct relationship with the internal and external conditions that prompted the merger and not entirely indicative of managerial superiority.
Publication Name: Managerial & Decision Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0143-6570
Year: 1996
User Contributions:
Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:
Tobin's Q, managerial ownership, and analyst coverage: a nonlinear simultaneous equations model
Article Abstract:
Analyst coverage and managerial ownership are seen to enhance the value of firms.
Publication Name: Journal of Economics and Business
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0148-6195
Year: 2000
User Contributions:
Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:
- Abstracts: Costly verification of cost performance and the competition for incentive contracts. Information sharing in oligopoly: the truth-telling problem
- Abstracts: Target costing performance based on alternative participation and evaluation methods: a laboratory experiment
- Abstracts: A note on the performance of simple specification tests for the Tobit model. A Comparison of the Amemiya GLS and the Lee- Maddala-Trost GZSLS in a Simultaneous-Equations Tobit Model
- Abstracts: The resolution of uncertainty: an experimental study. Post-cartel pricing during litigation. The role of nonbinding alternative dispute resolution in litigation
- Abstracts: Managerial judges: an economic analysis of the judicial management of legal discovery. Entry and managerial incentives: A note