A test for comparative income effects in an ultimatum bargaining experiment
Article Abstract:
Comparative bargaining has been proven to work efficiently under basic ultimatum games and ineffective in ultimatum tournaments. Comparative bargaining performs well in basic ultimatum games because it is an alternative means of generating relative income by rejecting low offers and it provides an adequate coverage for reputation and reciprocity. On the other hand, the comparative approach does poorly under ultimatum tournaments because it does not create an impact to the pecuniary equilibrium, leaving mean offers neither extreme nor lower.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 1996
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Precedent transfer in experimental conflict-of-interest games
Article Abstract:
Simple coordination games were used to analyze the process in which precedents or previous equilibrium experiences transfer across games. A 3-player conflict-of-interest game with two focal equilibria revealed that subjects essentially have the tendency to choose the action related with equal-payoff equilibrium after repeated exposure to an analogous 2-player game with equal-payoff equilibrium. Such subjects are also more likely to choose action associated with the coalitional equilibrium.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 1998
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An experimental test of a predator-prey model of appropriation
Article Abstract:
Research is presented concerning the experimental testing of Grossman and Kim's model of predator-prey relations over a sequence of eight periods during which decisions were made. A clear convergence to equilibrium was discovered.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 2001
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