Achieving greater cooperation in a noisy prisoner's dilemma: an experimental investigation
Article Abstract:
A comparison of the level of cooperation of two parties in a prisoner's dilemma was done using two experimental models. Results indicate that there is a need for a careful selection of the mechanisms used to lessen noise in prisoner's dilemmas to ensure positive results. Some feedback mechanisms could greatly influence effort choices. However, these mechanisms for noise reduction achieve varied levels of increased cooperation.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 1999
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Simultaneous evolution of learning rules and strategies
Article Abstract:
Endogenous learning rules are studied using stage game behavior, and similarities with symmetric learning rules are assessed.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 1999
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Spatial evolution of automata in the prisoners' dilemma
Article Abstract:
The concept of evolution is applied to a spatial model, taking into account prisoners' dilemmas.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 2000
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