An economic analysis of matrix structure, using multinational corporations as an illustration
Article Abstract:
The organizational design, called matrix (MX-form) structure, has both advantages and disadvantages in comparison with the more popular multidivisional (M-form) structure. By using a multinational corporations as an illustration, the matrix structure allows the 'budget-breaking' incentive mechanism to become accessible for activities along both dimensions of the organization. Unlike the M-form structure, the MX-form facilitates coordination along two or more dimensions in an organization as well as lessen the cost of coordination in other neglected dimensions.
Publication Name: Managerial & Decision Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0143-6570
Year: 1998
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The structuring of interfirm exchanges in business know-how: evidence from international collaborative ventures
Article Abstract:
The impact of transaction cost issues regarding the assignment of residual bearing and the designation of managerial control between two organizations that swap business information has been examined. Hypotheses which had been produced via a theoretical system founded on new institutional economics were examined using a simultaneous-equation model that was eventually backed up by the empirical results. Institutional arrangements are rarely distinguished in spite of theoretical distinctions.
Publication Name: Managerial & Decision Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0143-6570
Year: 1997
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Joint ventures for entry deterrence
Article Abstract:
A research on how joint ventures could be used effectively in entry deterrence was conducted. Based on assumptions of linear cost and linear demand, including Stackelberg-Cournot interactions between joint venture firms and incumbents, it was concluded that the creation of independent joint ventures by incumbents can prevent entry. Results also show that the number of potential entrants determines the best deterrence strategies.
Publication Name: Managerial & Decision Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0143-6570
Year: 1999
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