Asymmetric demand information in regulation
Article Abstract:
Product or service demand information is vital in the regulation of firms. When there is less information of the demand, firms can take this opportunity to overearn, However, this is not sustainable as regulators will notice the inconsistency and will seek to lower excess earnings to an allowed rate of return. Nevertheless, when firms see that the decrease in capital over the decrease in the allowed rate of return is more than zero, they will volunteer to provide the demand information themselves. These analyses are derived using a regulatory model with a one-part (per unit price) structure.
Publication Name: Studies in Economics and Finance
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 1086-7376
Year: 1998
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Cartel quotas under majority rule
Article Abstract:
The selection of quotas by cartels, commodity agreements, agricultural marketing boards and prorationing boards is studied. These legal volume- restricting organizations have published regulations and wider enforcement capabilities. Quota selection becomes difficult due to differences in costs and the size of cartel members. These conflicts are resolved by voting. Side- payments which influence votes are not allowed. The effects of voting on prices and welfare is studied.
Publication Name: American Economic Review
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0002-8282
Year: 1995
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The information content of dividend resumptions
Article Abstract:
The peculiarities and generalities of dividend resumption with dividend initiation are examined to identify its uniqueness. Long-term profits from dividend resumption exceed the profit from dividend initiation.
Publication Name: Studies in Economics and Finance
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 1086-7376
Year: 2004
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