Centralized bargaining and reorganized work: are they compatible?

Article Abstract:

The paper examines the implications for wage bargaining of an important aspect of the ongoing reorganization of work -- the move from occupational specialization toward multi-tasking. The analysis shows how, on account of such reorganization, centralized bargaining becomes increasingly inefficient and detrimental to firms' profit opportunities, since it prevents firms from offering their employees adequate incentives to perform the appropriate mix of tasks. The paper also shows how centralized bargaining inhibits firms from using wages to induce workers to learn how to use their experience from one set of tasks to enhance their performance at other tasks. In this way, the paper may also help explain the increasing resistance to centralized bargaining in various advanced market economies. JEL classification: D23; J24; J31; J51; J53 Keywords: Centralized wage bargaining; Restructuring of firms; Information flows; Employment; Wage formation

Brief Article

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The diffusion of mobile telecommunications services in the European Union

Article Abstract:

We study the technological and regulatory determinants of the diffusion of mobile telecommunications services in the European Union, using a logistic model of diffusion. We find that the transition from the analogue to the digital technology during the early 1990s, and the corresponding increase in spectrum capacity, had a major impact on the diffusion of mobile telecommunications. Countries which granted first licenses at later points in time show a significant but slow catching-up effect, implying international convergence only by around 2006. The impact of introducing competition has also been significant, during both the analogue and the digital period, though the effect was smaller than the technology effect. [C] 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: L1; L86; O3 Keywords: Technology diffusion; Regulation and competition; Mobile telecommunications

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Research and development, voluntary export restriction and tariffs

Article Abstract:

The effect of trade policy on domestic Research & Development (R&D) in oligopolistic markets is shown to depend on the nature of policy instruments: tariffs or non-tariff barriers. When the R&D investment has uncertain consequences on marginal cost, a voluntary export restriction (VER) decreases innovation by the domestic firm as compared to the free trade level. This result holds both under Cournot and Bertrand competition. A tariff increases R&D investment. It is a new rationale for Southern firms to prefer VER as a policy instrument, besides the well-known argument that it facilitates collusion. [C] 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: F12; F13 Keywords: Tariffs; Research & Development; Voluntary export restriction

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