Communication-proof equilibria in cheap-talk games

Article Abstract:

Communication-proof equilibria is defined in cheap-talk games. The game equilibria fulfill a condition of stability that ensures resistance to the effects of new communication opportunities. Focus is on possible equilibria partitions of good and bad equilibrium sets. A good equilibrium with such partitions makes an equilibrium for the original game resistant to communication. The existence of communication-proof equilibria is proven. Communication-proof outcomes are shown to be efficient in a common-interest game class.

Economic aspects, Economic research, Communication, Communications, Equilibrium (Economics)

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Coordination and learning with a partial language

Article Abstract:

Research investigating creative uses of language is presented. Particular attention is given to ways in which creative uses of language emerge from common structures of knowledge, even from incomplete language structures typical of changing environments.

Management, Creativity (Linguistics), Linguistic creativity

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An experimental investigation of optimal learning in coordination games

Article Abstract:

Optimal learning is investigated through experimentation using coordination games. Complex coordinations tasks and irrelevant information may hamper optimal learning.

Economics, Research and Development in the Social Sciences and Humanities, Learning, Psychology of, Learning theory (Psychology)

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