Competitive equilibria with asymmetric information

Article Abstract:

Competitive equilibria in economies where agents trade in markets for standardized, non-exclusive financial contracts were studied under conditions of asymmetric information. Problems related to the existence of competitive equilibria were identified using the developed framework. The results were the same under different forms of asymmetric information. The study showed that a minimal form of non-linearity of prices ensured the existence of competitive equilibria in both adverse selection and moral hazard

Economic aspects, Contracts

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Equilibria in systems of social interactions

Article Abstract:

Application of hidden Markov models, for analysis of equilibria in social interaction systems with multiple agents interacting at local and global levels, is described.

Canada, Usage, Probabilities, Probability theory, Social action

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Rational expectations equilibria of economies with local interactions

Article Abstract:

A study is conducted to examine the impact of social interaction between rational agents, on equilibria of economies.

Science & research, Interpersonal relations, Rational expectations (Economics)

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