Contracts and externalities: how things fall apart
Article Abstract:
The externalities of principal-agent relationship are discussed. Assuming contracts to be bilateral, a principal's approach to the job of issuing contracts to agents, when there is no coordination failure among them, is analyzed.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 2006
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Menu theorems for bilateral contracting
Article Abstract:
The application of menu theorems to understand the allocations equilibrium in a bilateral contracting environment where multiple principals issue contracts independently to multiple agents is analyzed.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 2006
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p-Best response set
Article Abstract:
A study on equilibrium selection using the set-valued concept, which is based on p-dominance concept of game theory, is presented. p-best response set is a generalized form of p-dominance concept.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 2006
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