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Costly transfer institutions and the core in an overlapping generations model

Article Abstract:

An analysis of the overlapping generations economy without intergenerational transfers and the institutions that are admissible for the first generation are presented. Institutions may support Pareto-improving provided they are costly to create and that they cost as much to build as they transfer. Benefits of a young generation is achieved by not performing by the existing institution and building an identical institution for old age.

Author: Sakovics, Jozsef, Esteban, Joan, Engineer, Merwan
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 1997
Religious, Grantmaking, Civic, Professional, and Similar Organizations, MEMBERSHIP ORGANIZATIONS, Economic aspects, Associations, institutions, etc., Associations

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Moral hazard and renegotiation in multi-agent incentive contracts when each agent makes a renegotiation offer

Article Abstract:

A mechanism was developed in which a second-best strategy can always be applied to the one-principal, multi-agent model. The mechanism developed involves formulation of a refinement assumption on the beliefs of agent and principal. Each agent is then permitted to make a renegotiation offer so as to obtain results that can be valid not only for the one-principal, one-agent model but also for the one-principal, multi-agent model.

Author: Osano, Hiroshi
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 1998
Economics, Research and Development in the Social Sciences and Humanities, Equilibrium (Economics)

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Delegating bargaining and renegotiation

Article Abstract:

Research into the commitment effect of delegated bargaining when the delegation contract is renegotiable is presented. It is found that, by using a bargaining agent, a player may boost his share of the available surplus even when the delegation contract is subject to renegotiation.

Author: Bester, Helmut, Sakovics, Jozsef
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 2001
Contract Administration, Contract management

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Subjects list: Research, Negotiation, Negotiations
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