Credible monetary policy in an infinite horizon model: recursive approaches

Article Abstract:

Recursive methods for studying optimal and time consistent policy in dynamic models are developed and used against Calvo's 1978 monetary model. Application of the method provides an algorithm always converging to the set of time consistent outcomes and results show that all such outcomes are Markovian. The method yields a complete characterization of the set of sustainable results which are intuitive and may be useful in a number of applications.

Econometrics & Model Building, Models, Economics, Econometrics, Monetary policy, Business models

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Bargaining a monetary union

Article Abstract:

Government bargainings over monetary union benefits are examined in a model characterized by a cash-in-advance market. The interaction between market behavior and union negotiations generates variant outcomes. Wealth and welfare distributions are indeterminate under such conditions. Since bargaining efficiency is not a definite factor, both governments have the tendency to prolong negotiations.

Research, Monetary unions, International mediation

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Financial fragility and the exchange rate regime

Article Abstract:

Financial fragility, exchange rate crises and monetary policy were studied in an open economy model.

Prices and rates, Foreign exchange, Foreign exchange rates, Economic research, Observations

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