Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation

Article Abstract:

The details of the evolved cultural learning capacities, in contrast to non-cultural species, create the conditions for the cultural evolution of prosociality. The culture-gene evolutionary approach explains the differences between cultural and genetic transmission, the differences between genetic and cultural group selection, and the evolutionary interaction between genes and culture.

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How to measure social interactions via group selection? Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes, and large-scale cooperation: a comment

Article Abstract:

Joseph Henrich's challenge of the Price equation of biology to locate large-scale cooperation of human beings gives way to argue social interactive mechanism in economic theory. The common analytical way to measure interactive effects of between-groups and within-group will be necessary to establish a definite direction of group selection.

Influence, Interpersonal relations

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Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation, by J. Henrich

Article Abstract:

The Price equations for biological evolution are adapted to cultural evolution by Joseph Henrich. This adaptation, in which genetic change is allocated to within-and between-group components, is discussed.

Works, Social evolution, Henrich, Joseph

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