A general model of information sharing in oligopoly

Article Abstract:

Analysis of a model on stochastic information sharing among oligopolies shows shows that allowing competitors know about one's profit function is always profitable and that enabling rivals to acquire greater insight into their own profitability functions results in strategy correlation and profitability relative to reaction curve slopes. This finding differs from those of other studies.

Oligopolies

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Enogenous sequencing of firm decisions

Article Abstract:

An analysis of firm decisions on the basis of endogenous sequencing is presented. It is shown that symmetrical information motivates a Stackelberg leader to consider being a leader rather than a Cournot duopolist. Superior information on demand provides a leader withthe option of lower ex ante profits compared to its situation when making simultaneous choices with the follower.

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