Decentralization and collusion
Article Abstract:
The extent of optimality of decentralization is investigated using a mathematical model in which agents work in sequence on a project, share information without the principal's knowledge and therefore has the opportunity to collude with one another. The model imposes the limited liability constraint implying non-transferable utility between two agents, that is, an agent with no money cannot transfer money to the other agent. Results indicate that decentralization always leads to the optimal distribution of surplus.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1998
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Trend-reverting fluctuations in the life-cycle model
Article Abstract:
The aggregate time series provides evidence of short-term dynamic adjustment that appears to be governed by complex or negative real eigenvalues with examples and extension. The life-cycle economies are studied in which aggregate saving depends non-trivially on the distribution of wealth among cohorts.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 2004
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The curse of wealth and power
Article Abstract:
A model in which being more powerful does not necessarily imply being wealthier is studied. It is found that if there are at least three players and power is correlated with initial wealth, the second strongest player will always be worse off than one of the weaker players.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 2004
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