Deviations, dynamics, and equilibrium refinements
Article Abstract:
Non-cooperative game theory equilibrium, which only exists if participants use a non-deviation play, can be affected by possible deviation refinements and renegotiations especially in games with multiple participants. Deviation refinements, which are more possible in games with high correspondence between players, can affect coalition-proof equilibrium only if they themselves are not affected by subsequent coalitional renegotiations. A model using different deviations shows the disparity between "stable" and "recurrent" equilibrium.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1996
User Contributions:
Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:
On the intransitivity of preferences consistent with similarity relations
Article Abstract:
Rubinstein's work related to similarity relations-based decision-making proved to be valid based on experimental results of an analysis involving transitiveness of preferences. Specifically, Rubinstein's claim on the negative effect of perception limitation on the effectiveness of transitivity property to illustrate human choices was validated by experimental results. It was revealed that preferences tend to be intransitive when alternatives of arbitrary dimensions are permitted.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1998
User Contributions:
Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:
- Abstracts: Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information. On the communication complexity of expected-profit maximization
- Abstracts: Wage formation, investment and growth in The Netherlands in the postwar period: a cross-section analysis. Dutch economic growth in comparative-historial perspective, 1500-2000
- Abstracts: Globalisation, social conflict and economic growth. Preference erosion, government revenues and non-tariff trade barriers
- Abstracts: The first-best sharing rule in the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility. Asymptotic efficiency in dynamic principal-agent problems
- Abstracts: Economists' models of learning. Money with idiosyncratic uninsurable returns to capital