Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers?
Article Abstract:
A study was conducted to examine the role played by the independent outside directors of target firms in managing the conflicts that the offers can create between the managers and shareholders of these firms. The function of the directors in bolstering shareholder wealth during the process is also investigated. Analysis of 169 tender offers made from 1989 to 1992 indicates higher initial tender offer premium, bid premium revision and target shareholder gains when the the board of the target company is independent.
Publication Name: Journal of Financial Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0304-405X
Year: 1997
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Corporate restructuring during performance declines in Japan
Article Abstract:
The corporate restructuring activities in 92 Japanese corporations, which encountered significant decreases in operating performance in 1986 through 1990, were studied and compared with activities of US firms which experienced similar financial situations. The Japanese firms employed restructuring procedures such as asset sales, plant closures, and layoffs with less frequency than US firms. The occurrences can be explained by the influence of the distribution of equity ownership and debt claims in the firms.
Publication Name: Journal of Financial Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0304-405X
Year: 1997
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Firm performance, corporate governance, and top executive turnover in Japan
Article Abstract:
A study was conducted on the influence of corporate governance during top executive turnover in Japanese companies. Data from 270 Japanese corporations included in Moody's International Reports from 1985-1990 were analyzed. Results showed that industry-adjusted return on assets, poor operating income and excess stock returns increased the possibility of nonroutine turnover. Companies with main bank relations and large shareholders were found to be more susceptible to outside succession.
Publication Name: Journal of Financial Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0304-405X
Year: 1995
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