Double-sided moral hazard and the nature of share contracts

Article Abstract:

A simple model of revenue- or profit-sharing arrangements based on double-sided moral hazard is used to explain some of the characteristics of these contractual arrangements. In particular, the model shows the optimality of linear contracts and the limited benefits derived from customizing terms. Such institutional arrangements are widely adopted in franchising, sharecropping, licensing, commercial leasing and contracts between authors and publishers.

Profit sharing, Revenue sharing

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Disclosing own subsidies in cooperative research projects

Article Abstract:

The reasons why firms taking part in cooperative research projects may want to hide information about own subsidies to their partners are examined.

Management, Disclosure statements (Accounting)

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The choice of cooperative strategies in sealed bid auctions

Article Abstract:

Sealed bid auctions are examined in the context of cooperative strategies.

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