Dynamic agency with feedback

Article Abstract:

A study uses a model that consists of a principal and an agent which both target stochastic processes that are serially related but uncorrelated with one other. The model uses a functional form of linear and exponential objective with quadratic processes. Results of the study reveal that it is optimal for the principal to control the information fed back to the agent. The serial correlation has empirical importance for the theory of managerial incentives and for the theory of business cycle fluctuations.

Business Personnel Management, Management Compensation, Models, Economic aspects, Human resource management, Executive compensation, Stochastic processes, Agency (Law), Commercial agents

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Agency theory and franchising: some empirical results

Article Abstract:

The agency theoretic approach to assessing empirical data on franchising indicate that franchisers do not optimize their profit-making opportunities. A cross-section of 548 franchisors was the sample and the results closely resembled a model that says there are incentive issues on both the franchisor's and franchisee's side. A study of the franchise contract explains the extent to which the franchisor franchises but not why franchisors use simple linear sharing rules.

Management, Franchises, Exclusive dealing agreements

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Empirical test of a separating equilibrium in National Football League contract negotiations

Article Abstract:

Empirical test was conducted for a separating equilibrium in the bargaining context of National Football League (NFL) contract negotiations. The separating equilibrium predicts that players who delay contracted agreement sign more lucrative contracts and are of higher ability. These predictions are tested by analyzing data on 1,873 players drafted by NFL teams from 1986-1991. The findings are consistent with the implications of the separating equilibrium.

Sports Teams and Clubs, Sports clubs, managers, & promoters, Professional Football, Contract Administration, Research, Labor relations, Football players, Labor contracts, Collective bargaining, National Football League, Contract management

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