Folk Theorem For Bilateral Bargaining with Vector Endowments
Article Abstract:
A two-player bargaining game involving the division of vector endowment sums is analyzed, with the discounting of single period utilities and alternating proposals. A weakly Pareto-efficient agreement is derived and its conditions delineated.
Publication Name: Bulletin of Economic Research
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0307-3378
Year: 2004
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Peer Pressure and Incentives
Article Abstract:
A limited liability and moral hazard multi-agent model is extended by the introduction of a peer pressure function. Optimal incentives are calculated under several conditions and their interrelationships are discussed.
Publication Name: Bulletin of Economic Research
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0307-3378
Year: 2006
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The Delaying Effect of Financing Constraints on Investment
Article Abstract:
A model is derived for a firm considering different investment projects under financing constraints that limit the firm to one project at a time. The value of waiting is then calculated for various conditions.
Publication Name: Bulletin of Economic Research
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0307-3378
Year: 2004
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