Limited horizon forecast in repeated alternate games

Article Abstract:

Extensive form games of complete and perfect information are usually solved through subgame perfect nash equilibrium. A game-theoretic solution concept is developed which can perform limited forecasting. Their properties are applied to a simple class of repeated alternative-move 2 x 2 games. It is assumed that the players have a limited ability to forecast the future.

Research, Forecasting, Games

---

Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation

Article Abstract:

A study explaining the learning in games with large extensive form, using the valuation of moves, is presented. This is preferred over game theoretic models, which fall short of explanation.

France, Valuation

---

Voluntary contributions to a joint project with asymmetric agents

Article Abstract:

The formulation of a teamwork model is discussed.

Models, Industrial project management, Project management, Work groups, Teamwork (Workplace)

Similar abstracts:

• Abstracts: Price competition for an informed buyer. Bargaining and markets: Complexity and the competitive outcome. Professional advice
• Abstracts: High tech's top 30. Warring for the convention trade; luring the meetings is tough but the money is good
• Abstracts: Bertrand competition when rivals' costs are unknown. Note on risk aversion and sharing of firm-specific information in duopolies
• Abstracts: Computers and the demand for skilled labour: industry- and establishment-level panel evidence for the UK. Do skill shortages reduce productivity? theory and evidence from the United Kingdom
• Abstracts: Policy and volatility of asset returns. Hypothesis testing in event studies: the case of variance changes. A case study of the impact of monetary policy on exchange rates

This website is not affiliated with document authors or copyright owners. This page is provided for informational purposes only. Unintentional errors are possible.