Multiple penalty mechanisms in a principal-agent model under different institutional arrangements

Article Abstract:

A study was conducted to analyze a principal-agent framework supporting a multiple penalty mechanism with monetary and resource-based penalties. The model was examined in two institutional settings, namely, a market economy and a centrally planned economy. Results indicated that the model promotes testable assumptions concerning differences in optimal penalty imposition between the two economic system.

Capitalism, Central planning

---

Environmental crime and punishment in the Czech Republic: penalties against firms and employees

Article Abstract:

Research is presented describing the study of environmental law enforcement practices in different types of economies. Developing economies, such as the Czech Republic, operate less strict regimes for protecting the environment.

Research, Environmental protection, Comparative economics

---

Effects of ownership and financial performance on corporate environmental performance

Article Abstract:

The impact of public and private sector ownership structure on capital investments and environmental management, in Czech Republic, is examined.

Forecasts, trends, outlooks, Czech Republic, Management dynamics, Management, Economic aspects, Forecasts and trends, Private companies, Corporate governance, Market trend/market analysis, Capital investments, Company business management, Capital investment, Publicly held corporations

Similar abstracts:

• Abstracts: On the existence of optimal contract mechanisms for incomplete information principal-agent models. On the existence of nonoptimal equilibria in dynamic stochastic economies
• Abstracts: Political party negotiations, income distribution, and endogenous growth. Transitional dynamics in an R and D based growth model with imitation: comparing its predictions to the data
• Abstracts: An ordered probit analysis of transaction stock prices. An equilibrium model of irreversible investment. When is time continuous?
• Abstracts: A simple model of expert and non-expert bidding in first-price auctions
• Abstracts: Coordination and learning with a partial language. All equilibria of the Vickery auction

This website is not affiliated with document authors or copyright owners. This page is provided for informational purposes only. Unintentional errors are possible.