Private monitoring in auctions
Article Abstract:
The impact of an auctioneer's withholding of information on the collusion among bidders participating in first-price auctions, within a repeated game environment, is analyzed. The bidders employ private strategies in such situations.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 2006
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All equilibria of the Vickery auction
Article Abstract:
The Vickrey's second-price sealed-bid auction with independent private values and three or more bidders is evaluated. It is shown that any effective reserve price implies uniqueness.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 2004
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