The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences

Article Abstract:

Issues are presented concerning submodular and supermodular games in which not all participants attempt to gain the maximization of material payoffs. The relationship of such actions to the theory of strategic delegation and to the theory of preference formation is discussed.

Strategic planning (Business), Incentives (Business)

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On the evolution of individualistic preferences: an incomplete information scenario

Article Abstract:

Research is presented concerning the influence of payoff monotonic dynamics in the evolution of preferences within strategic environments. The differences which occur with complete and without complete information are discussed.

Monotonic functions

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Evolving aspirations and cooperation

Article Abstract:

Cooperative behavior is exercised by the players of the game most of the time. Moreover, there is an adaptive learning process where players play dominated strategies of the game most of the time and they cooperate with each other. Even though there are times when a player may deviate from cooperative behavior and subsequently earn a profit, he will eventually return to mutual cooperation. Furthermore, game players tend to cooperate in the long run on the condition that aspiration levels are being updated slowly.

Cooperation (Economics), Cooperation

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