Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings

Article Abstract:

Firms' preferences are assessed in cases where such preferences are substitutable, and separability is identified as weaker than responsiveness.

Corporations, Agency theory

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Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues

Article Abstract:

Two-sided matching models can be used to evaluate the stability of matchings when the organization of co-workers or colleagues influence the preferences over institutions. Worker preferences over matchings, which are determined by the composition of colleagues or co-employees, are integrated into the models. Results that show the presence of matchings that are unaffected by a coalition of firms and agents are not entirely robust.

Models, Workers, Matching theory

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Voting under constraints

Article Abstract:

Various situations have proven that strategy-proof mechanisms must be derived from a generalization of the median voter principle. The wide class of situations include polar cases, which show preferences of agents that are totally unrestricted and preferences that are single-peaked. A quality must be met to be called the intersection property, which becomes forceful as the preference domain is increased. Results were proven to accelerate impossibility theorems, particularly suggesting the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem as a corollary.

Elections, Analysis, Voting

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