Optimal inflation contracts and inflation targets with uncertain central bank preferences: accountability through independence

Article Abstract:

A model of standard optimal contracts and inflation targets was used to assess the relationship of central bank preferences with optimal delegation arrangements for independent central banks. A no-delegation policy proved to be the most desirable delegation arrangements depending on the consensus of the society concerning costs and benefits of inflation and output stabilization. Such policy is preferred since the likelihood that a central bank preference is distorted in relation to society remains.

Federal Reserve Banks, Monetary Authorities - Central Bank, Economic aspects, Inflation (Finance), Central banks, Monetary policy, Inflation (Economics)

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Traditional productivity estimates are asleep at the (technological) switch

Article Abstract:

Traditional productivity measures cannot compute for technological change and this makes them inefficient economic indicators. Real output and wage measures do not account for gains made through technological innovations while price measurement and growth measures produce biases. Calculating for biases can generate a fairly accurate measure of productivity that accounts also for technological change and gains associated with changes.

Analysis, Accounting and auditing, Technological innovations, Economic indicators, Productivity accounting

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