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Property rights, corruption and the allocation of talent: a general equilibrium approach

Article Abstract:

A modeling of bureaucratic corruption and its effects on investments, property rights and allocation of talents show that in some instances it may an optimal policy to allow some form of corruption and suppress strict enforcement of property rights. This is due to the inability of enforcement to provide the necessary incentives for enforcement agents in enforcing contractual guarantees. Allowing some form of corruption results in better incentives for enforcement agents which results in the freer flow of investements.

Author: Acemoglu, Daron, Verdier, Thierry
Publisher: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
Publication Name: Economic Journal
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0013-0133
Year: 1998
Economic Views, Models, Economic policy, Contracts, Political corruption

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Learning about others' actions and the investment accelerator

Article Abstract:

A study was conducted to evaluate the impact of information involving other agents' actions on the acceleration of investment. The study considers data from the US and UK and focuses on economic states and employment-investment relationships. Results show that imperfect information generates increases in economic fluctuations whch may lead to output and efficiency losses. In addition, an employment accelerator exhibits more importance in the US while the investment accelerator is more active in the UK.

Author: Acemoglu, Daron
Publisher: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
Publication Name: Economic Journal
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0013-0133
Year: 1993
Research, Employment, Economics, Information theory, Information theory in economics

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Beyond Becker: training in imperfect labour markets

Article Abstract:

Companies are not expected to invest in general training when market conditions are competitive. However, companies will sponsor training programs in imperfect or non-competitive labor markets to establish equilibrium conditions. Such a model must integrate the impact of training on labor market institutions, wage structures and the incentive to invest in employee training.

Author: Acemoglu, Daron, Pischke, Jorn-Steffen
Publisher: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
Publication Name: Economic Journal
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0013-0133
Year: 1999
Labor market, Employee training, Manpower policy

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Subjects list: Investments, Economic aspects
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