R&D in a model of search and growth

Article Abstract:

Theories must be developed as a foundation for relating market organization with economic development. One such theory is endogenous growth, where a microeconomic foundation is established for the growth process. The theory has diverged focus into a capital accumulation market characterized by competitive price-takers and into a firm price-setting market marked by technological innovation. Removal of a Walrasian auctioneer's coordinating function allows the development of a market where search and bargaining frictions condition the trading process.

Models, Economic development, Industrial organization, Equilibrium (Economics)

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Velocity of money in a modified cash-in-advance economy: theory and evidence

Article Abstract:

An analysis of money velocity under modified cash-in-advance economies is presented. The analysis develops a model where money precedes the purchase of consumption goods and of a fraction of the capitalm good. The modelthen allows an examination of money velocity against dynamic equilibrium constraints. It is shown that high money growth equilibria is positively related to lower welfare and velocity.

Economic aspects, Money, Circular velocity of money

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The economics of 'new blood.'

Article Abstract:

Uneven wages among various age groups are explained by differences in knowledge acquisition.

United States, Science & research, Unemployment, Research, Learning, Wages, Wages and salaries, Salary

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