Rigging the lobbying process: an application of the all-pay auction
Article Abstract:
A rent-seeking model of the lobbying process is presented to show how politicians announce a group of potential candidates and carry out political favors. Lobbying is an implicit, accepted form of obtaining political favors. The political process is modeled as a game of complete information in which politicians accept the concept of lobbying but can narrow down the list of potential candidates. The candidates participate in an all-pay auction in which the lobbyist with the largest bribe is the winner and all others receive nothing.
Publication Name: American Economic Review
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0002-8282
Year: 1993
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Capital structure and product-market rivalry: how do we reconcile theory and evidence?
Article Abstract:
The relationship between capital structure decisions and product market behavior is examined. It is shown that low-productivity plants in highly concentrated industries exhibited greater recapitalization and debt financing potential. This potential establishes the impact of debt in such industries where agency costs are not minimized by rival product markets. Market leverage is viewed as a strategic response to prevent managers from enforcing aggressive policies that should be applied under more favorable conditions.
Publication Name: American Economic Review
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0002-8282
Year: 1995
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Divisionalization, franchising, and divestiture incentives in oligopoly
Article Abstract:
Companies that diversify their products through divisionalization contribute more to social welfare than their profit-making policy. Companies form divisions in order to exhaust the profit-making capabilities of each division. However, a company can also obtain maximum profits by selling franchises or by ultimately selling each division to independent buyers. In both cases, these units are prohibited from further dividing to force them to compete in the market.
Publication Name: American Economic Review
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0002-8282
Year: 1996
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