Ronald Coase on the nature of social cost as a key to the problem of the firm

Article Abstract:

Ronald Coase's publication of an economic treatise on social costs was a watershed in the field of economics. It opened up channels for interacting with non-market and non-price factors such as the government, the legal system and institutions. The concept of transaction costs for the firm, while not necessarily new, was not incorporated in theoretical economic models. Coase provided the framework and methodology to deal with the concept.

Research, Externalities (Economics), Works, Industrial organization, Institutional economics

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Ronald Coase - old-fashioned scholar

Article Abstract:

Ronald Coase is considered one of the leading economists of the 20th century. Coase's contribution to the field of social science lies in his theories that serve as the bedrock of 'institutional economics,' a branch of economics that integrates legal aspects. Among his favorite theories are those dealing with social costs and property rights. Coase's theories are even used by law students and have become staples in law school curricula.

Economic policy, Influence, Economists

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Bibliography of Ronald H. Coase's publications, 1935-1991

Article Abstract:

Presented is a list of books and periodical articles written by noted economist Ronald H. Coase between the years 1935 and 1991.

Economics, Bibliography

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