Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market
Article Abstract:
The problem of a matching market that is characterized by duality is tackled by introducing the concept of an equilibrium that cannot be rematched. This solution is given to answer the dilemma posed by Roth which involves finding the right mix of determinants that would produce stable matchings. It may not be totally free of misreported preferences, but this particular solution is characteristically compatible with the true profile.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1995
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Coalition proof equilibrium in an adverse selection insurance economy
Article Abstract:
Coalition proof equilibrium is tested in a market where players have private information under game theoretic conditions. Application of the model to an adverse selection insurance economy generated a market that maximized allocation efficiency without cross-subsidy. Such results are not observed in markets where agents follow self-enforcing agreements based on individual incentive compatibility constraints.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1995
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