On efficiency-inducing taxation for a non-renewable resource monopolist
Article Abstract:
An examination of taxation policy relating to nonrenewable resources monopolists revealed that when the state followed the incremental surplus subsidy scheme with an exit tax (ISSET), monopolists chose efficient paths of extraction. ISSET was a nonlinear rule which enabled the state to tax monopolists efficiently despite possessing little information about reserves or costs. Schemes such as the incremental surplus subsidy (ISS) and the ISSET continued to function even if variables, such as the effort made to extract nonrenewable resources, were not observed by the state.
Publication Name: The Journal of Public Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0047-2727
Year: 1992
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How to tax a spatial monopolist
Article Abstract:
A model reflects the activity between a government that maximizes tax revenue and a spatial monopolist that maximizes profit. The model assumes the government utilizes a per-unit output tax and a transport tax, while the monopolist is able to strategically change its location and mode of transport. The model demonstrates that if the government is only allowed to use one tax instrument, it would use a per-unit output tax as this forces the monopolist to use inefficient strategic choices in order to avoid profit losses.
Publication Name: The Journal of Public Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0047-2727
Year: 1996
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Truth or consequences: enforcing pollution standards with self-reporting
Article Abstract:
An extension of the standard model of enforcement was formulated which takes into account self-reporting requirement and enforcement power. The model shows that higher compliance rates are attained with lower noncompliance fines. The model also reveals that an equal to zero noncompliance fine tends to lessen the cost of implementing a given level of aggregate pollution. Such findings opposes a traditional claim that higher fines result to higher compliance rates.
Publication Name: The Journal of Public Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0047-2727
Year: 1999
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- Abstracts: On the macroeconomic implication of maintenance in public capital. The spillover effects of state spending
- Abstracts: On efficiency of decentralized environmental regulation. Controlling pollution with relaxed regulations
- Abstracts: Optimal taxation and spending in general competitive growth models. On optimal non-linear taxation and public good provision in an overlapping generations economy
- Abstracts: Sources of inefficiency in subsidized housing programs: a comparison of U.S. and German experience. Theory and estimation in the economics of housing demand
- Abstracts: Long-run trends in labor supply. Controlling inflation with an interest rate instrument. Index numbers and the measurement of real GDP