Optimal unemployment insurance

Article Abstract:

An equilibrium search model calibrated from information derived from reemployment bonus experiments is used to study the structure of an optimal unemployment insurance program. It is deduced that an optimal program would allow for the unlimited potential duration of unemployment insurance benefits. If potential benefit duration was unrestricted, US replacement rates would be more or less appropriate. It is also found that as the potential of benefits duration is restricted, the optimal replacement rate increases.

Pension, health, and welfare funds, Pension Funds & Benefit Plans, Pension Funds, Analysis, Prices and rates, Employee benefits, Supplemental unemployment benefits, Replacement cost insurance

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Employment turnover and the public allocation of unemployment insurance

Article Abstract:

The differences in the unemployment benefits and employment and unemployment turnover in Europe and in the US were examined. A model of the political determination of the unemployment insurance level was constructed to explain the regional differences with focus on a case where all individuals were ex-ante identical. Results indicate that preferences over the insurance level become dependent on current assets.

Administration of General Economic Programs, Jobs & Employment, Models, Europe

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Benefit entitlement and unemployment duration: the role of policy endogeneity

Article Abstract:

Impact of change in the unemployment benefits on the duration of joblessness of elderly people in Austria is analyzed.

Austria, Labor force information, Government domestic functions, Aged, Elderly, Economic aspects, Social policy

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