Optimality of a competitive equilibrium in a small open city with congestion
Article Abstract:
A competitive equilibrium model is constructed for a small, open spatial city market economy with differing rural and urban areas. It is assumed that consumers possess the same utility functions regardless of whether they reside within or without the city, and acquire their utility by paying for consumables and housing space. Urban residents are assumed to pay commuting expenses to the central business district apart from their consumables and housing space. Assuming that no government fee for congestion tolls exist and numerous rival commuter transit services are present, the model will derive a set of equilibrium conditions for the competitive market and demonstrate that competitive influences will result in social optimum allocations.
Publication Name: Journal of Urban Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0094-1190
Year: 1998
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The economics of pricing parking
Article Abstract:
The major source of congestion in urban areas is search for parking. Therefore, to examine the benefits of pricing parking, it is treated as a common property resource.
Publication Name: Journal of Urban Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0094-1190
Year: 2004
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An integrated model of downtown parking and traffic congestion
Article Abstract:
A study examines traffic congestion caused by vehicles awaiting parking on streets. The impact of increases in parking fees at parking facilities is discussed.
Publication Name: Journal of Urban Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0094-1190
Year: 2006
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