Partial privatization in mixed duopoly
Article Abstract:
Partial privatization in a quantity-setting duopoly involving a private firm and a privatized firm was investigated. In addition, the number of shares that the government should hold in a privatized firm was analyzed. Results showed that full ownership of a firm by the government is not optimal unless the firm is a monopolist, suggesting that public enterprises should be at least partially privatized in a mixed oligopoly. Similarly, full privatization is not optimal if the firm is as efficient as a private firm.
Publication Name: The Journal of Public Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0047-2727
Year: 1998
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Politicians' decision making with re-election concerns
Article Abstract:
Politicians who have the probability of losing on their reelection bids tend to undertake numerous major projects. They are also very willing to pay for new projects. On the other hand, incumbents who are already sure of being reelected tend to undertake projects occassionally and are less willing to pay for new projects. Reelection concerns of politicians also have an impact on the way they handle their bids for jurisdictions over other firms.
Publication Name: The Journal of Public Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0047-2727
Year: 1997
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