Worker demand for health insurance in the non-group market
Article Abstract:
Data from the Current Population Survey and the Survey of Income and Program Participation were examined together with price data for standard health insurance products to understand decisions to buy health insurance by workers with no employment-based insurance. The results show price elasticity between -0.3 and -0.4 and income elasticity of 0.15. The estimated price response indicates that uninsured workers may not be induced to voluntarily buy insurance even with substantial subsidies.
Publication Name: Journal of Health Economics
Subject: Health care industry
ISSN: 0167-6296
Year: 1995
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Adverse selection with a multiple choice among health insurance plans: a simulation analysis
Article Abstract:
The consequences of adverse selection was measured using a simulation method. Families were investigated on their ability to forecast their risk and its influnce in their decisions to have insurance coverage. Results indicated that multiple choice markets tend to ignore high-option benefit plans due to adverse selection if a sole, experience-rated premium is sought by the insurer. Decrease in adverse selection was found to be dependent on variations in demographic factors.
Publication Name: Journal of Health Economics
Subject: Health care industry
ISSN: 0167-6296
Year: 1992
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