An ordered choice model of promotion rules

Article Abstract:

This paper continues an important but short line of research investigating nonpecuniary outcomes of collective bargaining. These outcomes define the rules governing the employment relationship. The determinants of one of the most important of these rules - the one that governs the intrafirm allocation of labor - are analyzed. Specifically, micro-level data are used to estimate the determinants of promotion rules in major collective bargaining agreements in U.S. manufacturing. A multinomial choice model is estimated once these rules have been ordered along the joint dimension of increasing weight attached to seniority across a broadening seniority unit. The evidence suggests that contracts involving small, capital-intensive firms, whose technologies value specific training, in single-employer bargaining units, that contain an increasing proportion of men, are most likely to exhibit promotion rules that heavily weight company-wide seniority. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)

Analysis, Employee promotions

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Do union members receive compensating differentials? The case of employment security

Article Abstract:

This study presents evidence in the ongoing examination of whether or not union wage effects represent, in part, premiums to unpleasant aspects of unionized work. Three major empirical results follow: first, approximately one-sixth of the union differential can be attributed to the greater employment risk of union members; second, nearly one-half of the union return, and over one-third the non-union return, to union density can simultaneously be attributed to employment risk; and third, union members, on balance, receive larger premiums for employment risk. Such results extend previous work which argues that unions help reveal preferences about workplace public goods. In addition, they support those who contend that union density proxies other relevant omitted variables. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)

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Unions, seniority, and public choice

Article Abstract:

The indirect results of conferring a seniority-based layoff rule to a union whose actions are decided by median vote can be studied by using a median voter model of the union's wage-employment decree and by considering an individual lifetime contract and an extension in which participative voting on a series of contracts takes place. Results indicate that senior workers, by demanding high wages that cause younger workers to lose jobs, inhibit union expansion. Unions expand when companies resist union demands and when they need to increase the amount of union dues.

Employee seniority, Seniority

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