Repeated trade and the velocity of money

Article Abstract:

An analysis of the impact of inefficiency on strategic market equilibria is presented. The oligopolistic effect generates ineeficiency by allowing a single agent to influence market prices. The provision of many agents eliminates such price determination procedures. However, the market equilibrium may still be inefficient because of imperfect liquidity conditions. It is shown that certain trade rounds for a given utility period overcomes the liquidity problem.

Research, Economic aspects, Money, Equilibrium (Economics), Oligopolies, Foreign exchange market

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From Nash to Walras via Shapley-Shubik

Article Abstract:

Walras equilibria (WE) is found to be with in the limits of Nash equlibria (NE) theorem on non cooperative games. A basic model in which firms compete on how much output to produce and sell, in a single market, is explained. Walras equilibria game is just a variant of the Shapely-Shubik trading-post game.

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Price-mediated trade with quantity signals: an axiomatic approach

Article Abstract:

Two mechanisms namely- Shapley-Shubik and Shapley are examined to understand the relation between the quantity signals provided by the individuals, that is how much quantity they are willing to sell, and the reciprocation of the market to it, in the commodities trade.

Commodity markets

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