Internal organization and managerial compensation in oligopoly
Article Abstract:
The main issues to be considered when looking at an oligopolistic market in which companies can choose the best type of internal organisation to deal with the competitive forces in place are the distribution of management tasks, thus determining how much specialisation there is in the company, and the type of managerial compensation used by the company. Even theoretically identical oligopolistic companies do not have to have the same type of internal organisation, as the advantages they derive from departmentalisation are reduced if a competing company also chooses this route. Implications for the quantities produced, for the informativeness of revenues and for the overall advantages resulting from managerial effort must all be considered.
Publication Name: International Journal of Industrial Organization
Subject: Business, international
ISSN: 0167-7187
Year: 1993
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Profit, entry and changes in concentration
Article Abstract:
A study of the simultaneity between profit, entry and changes in concentration made from 481 observations of four-digit US manufacturing industries in 1972-1977 and 1977-1982 shows that profit rates are boosted by concentration and entry barriers. There is a direct link between entry rates and profit, while barriers have a negative effect on entry rates. However, the system as a whole changes only very slowly, and the average adjustment rate remains very low, indicating that concentration moves only very slowly towards a balanced level.
Publication Name: International Journal of Industrial Organization
Subject: Business, international
ISSN: 0167-7187
Year: 1993
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Vertical integration or separation of the sales function as implied by competitive forces
Article Abstract:
Decisions made by competing firms on sales strategies were examined. It was shown that asymmetric equilibria may arise when there is a moderate correlation between demand schedules faced by the competitors. Only one company decides to put up its own sales force. The other competitor resorts to an independent sales agency to sell its product. However, only symmetric equilibria can arise when there is high correlation in their demand schedules.
Publication Name: International Journal of Industrial Organization
Subject: Business, international
ISSN: 0167-7187
Year: 1999
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