Modeling simultaneous worker learning and forgetting in dual resource constrained systems

Article Abstract:

A worker learning and forgetting model has been analyzed in the context of training-related issues associated with dual resource constrained systems. The model, developed by Carlson and Rowe (1976), was utilized to critically examine the extent of worker flexibility, attrition rates, forgetting rates and flexibility acquisition policies. Findings show that a worker may not be able to attain full efficiency in at least two different departments due to higher forgetting and attrition rates, indicating that acquiring even incremental worker flexibility under such conditions may prove infeasible. It was also found that managers can use different flexibility acquisition policies to reduce relearning losses and improve system performance in the process.

Psychological aspects, Learning, Memory, Organizational behavior, Workers, Resource allocation, Teaching models

---

Job challenge as a motivator in a principal-agent setting

Article Abstract:

The motivational effects of job challenge in a principal-agent environment have been investigated using cases of moral hazard and adverse selection problems. To this end, the utility derived by the agent from job-challenge was operationalized by integrating the motivational effects of Atkinson (1958) explicitly in the agent's utility. Results show that the motivational effect increases as the marginal productivity of the agent's effort increases. The job-challenge either increases or decreases depending on the agent's utility from job-challenge. In addition, the monetary incentives decrease as the agent's utility from job-challenge increases.

Employee motivation, Work design, Marginal utility, Marginal productivity

---

The design of supply contracts as a problem of delegation

Article Abstract:

The design of supply contracts as a problem of delegation is analyzed. It is shown that the best instruction is determined by a trade-off between the costs due to the time the principal allocates for dealing with the problem and the time spent for the formulation of instructions. The costs associated with the suboptimal menu of contracts offered by the agent are also taken into account.

Similar abstracts:

• Abstracts: Airbus knocks Boeing off its perch. Frequent flier and related travel incentive programs. TNT Express - international air express delivery
• Abstracts: Lighting and electrics. Theme: lighting and electrics
• Abstracts: Guest commentary: An emerging market in the European Union. Greece plans fourth telecoms offer. Greece sells Agricultural Insurance
• Abstracts: Israel prepares further Bezeq offer. Australian gravy train keeps rolling
• Abstracts: Centre of attraction. The ins and outs of human resources

This website is not affiliated with document authors or copyright owners. This page is provided for informational purposes only. Unintentional errors are possible.