On the frequency, quality, and informational role of mandatory financial reports

Article Abstract:

A study examined the relationship between the frequency of mandatory financial disclosures, the amount of information voluntarily disclosed by privately informed managers and the consequent informational efficiency of stock prices. This research focused on two qualitative characteristics of mandated financial reports: the precision of audited financial reports in determining the true economic income of a particular firm and the timeliness of the availability of this information. Findings did not support for the hypothesis that increased timeliness would achieve desirable implications for the information efficiency of share prices. Results also failed to prove that the success of a particular accounting regime in generating informationally efficient prices can be appraised on the response of prices to earnings announcements.

Profits, Corporation reports, Company reports, Disclosure statements (Accounting), Efficient market theory, Corporate profits

---

Discussion of moral hazard and management control in just-in-time settings

Article Abstract:

Alles, Datar and Lambert (1995) investigated management control and motivational issues associated with Just-in-Time (JIT) inventory production systems within the context of agency theory. They employed Holmstrom and Milgrom's linear principal-agent model where a risk-neutral principal and a risk- and effort-averse agent enter a contract specifying that the latter would provide 'effort' to the former. Their findings are reported in 10 propositions classified into three groups: deterministic production, uncertain production with one performance measure, and uncertain production with two performance measures. The Alles et al. study validates the belief that, if there is an inverse relationship between inventory level and transparency, inventory should be reduced below its otherwise optimal level to minimize moral hazard.

Employee motivation, Inventory control, Just in time inventory systems, Just in time systems

---

On the value of transparency in agencies with renegotiation

Article Abstract:

It is shown that in an agency model that allows for contract renegotiation, the desirability of a fully transparent reporting regime hinges on the stewardship properties of the information in question. Information that is mainly useful for predicting future events and of little use for evaluating past actions should only be made available to the public through management's self-interested disclosures.

United States, Regulation, Licensing, and Inspection of Miscellaneous Commercial Sectors, Financial Regulation & Reporting, Models, Financial statements, Financial disclosure

Similar abstracts:

• Abstracts: Information technology and financial services consolidation. Banking deregulation: allocational consequences of relaxing entry barriers
• Abstracts: International and foreign bond markets. International financial markets: overview. Direct investment flows in 1992: overall decline continues
• Abstracts: Optimizing the interaction of children with information and communication technologies. A randomized and controlled trial of a participative ergonomics intervention to reduce injuries associated with manual tasks: Physical risk and legislative
• Abstracts: Migration correlation: definition and efficient estimation. Market vs. bank-based financial systems: do rights and regulations really matter?
• Abstracts: House members Rap DOD space acquisitions. DOD chemical disposal off track, Senators fear

This website is not affiliated with document authors or copyright owners. This page is provided for informational purposes only. Unintentional errors are possible.