A theory of holdouts in wage bargaining
Article Abstract:
An evaluation of a model that portrays 'holdouts' as a delaying tactic in wage bargaining reveals that the incentive to use holdouts increases as the number of wage negotiations increase within a particular industry. Moreover, the study reveals that holdouts are 'bunched' within industries as others soon follow after one holdout has ended and that holdouts ending later in a group are less likey to end in strikes.
Publication Name: American Economic Review
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0002-8282
Year: 1998
User Contributions:
Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:
A spatial theory of trade
Article Abstract:
Impact of trade barriers, such as national borders, on international and regional trade with relation to agglomeration and congestion forces is presented.
Publication Name: American Economic Review
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0002-8282
Year: 2005
User Contributions:
Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:
- Abstracts: Endogeneity of alternating offers in a bargaining game. The optimal design of a market. Voluntary implementation
- Abstracts: Executive briefing. Gaza: the closure
- Abstracts: Using electoral cycles in police hiring to estimate the effect of police on crime. White-collar crime writ small: a case study of bagels, donuts, and the honor system
- Abstracts: A note on closet--indexing. Subsistence consumption, habit formation and the demand for long-term bonds. The value of active portfolio management
- Abstracts: The organisation of capabilities. Learning to play Cournot duopoly strategies. Production in advance versus production to order