Caps on political lobbying
Article Abstract:
An analysis of the effects of imposing caps on political lobbying finance reveals that an exogenous cap on all-pay auction bids weakly reduces a high valuation bidder's chances of winning. The study also reveals that caps also may have a perverse effect on increasing aggregate contributions while lowering total surplus as results show that limits on individual expenditures may increase total expenditures and limit total surplus.
Publication Name: American Economic Review
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0002-8282
Year: 1998
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Caps on political lobbying: comment
Article Abstract:
A study examines the impact of government limits on spending and lobbying in political and sport contests.
Publication Name: American Economic Review
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0002-8282
Year: 2006
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Caps on political lobbying: reply
Article Abstract:
A study examines the varying theories on imposing limits on expenditure in political lobbying.
Publication Name: American Economic Review
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0002-8282
Year: 2006
User Contributions:
Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:
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