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Collusion and delegation

Article Abstract:

The delegation problem can be met when both collusive properties and limits on communication are considered simultaneously. Limits on communication set an anonymity condition on the grand-contract, thus, resulting to several stakes for collusive behavior that weaken the efficiency of the centralized arrangement when agents are treated in a balance manner. Under delegation, anonymity is rather diminished by design, benefitting from the conflict between the agents coming from their asymmetric treatment on the organization.

Author: Martimort, David, Laffront, Jean-Jacques
Publisher: Rand, Journal of Economics
Publication Name: RAND Journal of Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0741-6261
Year: 1998
Decentralized Organization, Analysis, Price fixing, Decentralization (Management)

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Separation of regulators against collusive behavior

Article Abstract:

The separation of powers in regulation may function as a device against the threat of regulatory capture. Separation minimizes the discretion of nonbenevolent regulators and the sum of their profits in engaging into socially wasteful activities. Under asymmetric information, the supply of possible bribes always exceeds the total demand of the regulators when their collusive offers are accepted by the agents whatever their personal characteristics.

Author: Laffont, Jean-Jacques, Martimort, David
Publisher: Rand, Journal of Economics
Publication Name: RAND Journal of Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0741-6261
Year: 1999
Other General Government Support, Agencies-Administrative, Management, Industry regulations, Government regulation of business, Trade regulation, Administrative agencies, Government agencies

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Exclusive dealing, common agency, and multiprincipals incentive theory

Article Abstract:

The advantages and disadvantages of exclusive dealerships as compared to multiple dealerships are examined. A model is developed to examine competition between manufacturers and retailers with the assumption that contracts between manufacturers and retailers are held secret. The preference of competing manufacturers for retail outlets is also studied. It has been found out that competition eliminates incentive problems.

Author: Martimort, David
Publisher: Rand, Journal of Economics
Publication Name: RAND Journal of Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0741-6261
Year: 1996
Retail Trade, Competition (Economics), Economic aspects, Retail industry, Manufacturers' agents, Manufacturers' representatives

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Subjects list: Models
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