Contracting in the sahdow of a corrupt court

Article Abstract:

Economic distortions can result from judificial favoritism and judicial corruption, and this can lead to inefficiency as a result of agents' incentives being distorted. Adam Smith noted the importance of the legal system for economic efficiency. Political change can also affect investment where corruption is a problem, with investment likely to be more sensitive to political change in economies where corruption is more prevalent. Agents can benefit from good political connections. Further research could use this model as a basic building block.

Political corruption, Judicial process

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Incomplete contracts and breach remedies

Article Abstract:

Agents can choose to cut production costs prior to trade occurring, and this leads to questions as to how the greatest efficiency can be achieved through breach remedies, in relations between agents and principals. First-best efforts are not usually achievable, weven where there is specific performance written in ex ante contracts. First best can be achieved where the breach remedy consists of expectation damage. The impact on bilateral investment should be assessed in further research.

Breach of contract

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The economics of envy

Article Abstract:

A model is presented to demonstrate the role of envy in economic behaviour as an extension of equity theory in psychology. The propensities of agents for envy and legal institutions are shown to jointly determine agents' sharing, sabotaging, retaliating and innovating behaviour.

Models, Economic research, Equality, Envy

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