Efficient risk-taking and regulatory covenant enforcement in a deregulated banking industry
Article Abstract:
After deregulation, competition among U.S. banks gave way to incentives to operate more efficiently or take higher levels of risks. Those that operated efficiently were permitted more latitude in their investment strategies.
Publication Name: Journal of Economics and Business
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0148-6195
Year: 2001
User Contributions:
Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:
Do depositors care about enforcement actions?
Article Abstract:
Economists opined that public announcement of formal enforcement actions enhances market discipline while bank supervisors said this sparks runs. Investigation reveals depositors did not care.
Publication Name: Journal of Economics and Business
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0148-6195
Year: 2001
User Contributions:
Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:
- Abstracts: Exchange rate regimes and export performances of developing countries. The role of international fragmentation in the development process
- Abstracts: Technical change and wage-share fluctuations in a regime-switching model. The Phillips curve, regime switching, and the NAIRU
- Abstracts: To build or buy: an empirical study of the characterisitcs affecting a bank's expansion decisions. Small bank loan quality in a deregulated environment: the information advantage hypothesis